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The functioning of labour markets from a demand-side perspective is examined. In
particular, the determinants of vacancy duration are studied in the context of a model
of employers’ search behaviour. A model for the choice of the recruitment strategy at
the start of the search process and the corresponding recruitment duration is de-
veloped in which allowance is made for di erent patterns of duration dependence for
each recruitment strategy. This model is applied to data on employers’ search
behaviour in the Dutch labour market. It is found that employers prefer advertise-
ments as the ® rst recruitment channel when applicants are required to have work
experience. Moreover, employers prefer to start searching via the labour exchange
o ce when jobs in the secondary segment of the labour market have to be ® lled. It is
also found that Ð when advertisements are used as the ® rst recruitment strategy
Ð employers need some time to acquire a pool of applicants and to select candidates
from this pool. It is interesting as a contrast that applicants seem to be evaluated
rather quickly if employers start searching via informal contacts.
I . INTRODUCTION
Since the beginning of the 1980s unemployment has shown
dramatic growth in the Netherlands. Even though there has
been a remarkable rise in the number of jobs (starting in the
mid-1980s) , the reduction of unemployment is still modest.
Paradoxically, employers’ associations complain about
vacancies that are hard to ® ll. Apparently, there is an in-
creasing mismatch of demand and supply in the Dutch
labour market.
At the micro level, imbalances in the labour market
have, in a large number of studies, often been analysed
on the basis of supply side indicators, such as the dura-
tion of unemployment (see, e.g. the pioneering studies of
Lancaster, 1979; Nickell, 1979). These studies are usually
based on the theory of job search (for an overview see
Mortensen, 1986). Much less attention has been paid
to demand side indicators of the functioning of the labour
market, such as vacancy duration (see for example,
Beaumont, 1978; Roper, 1988; Renes, 1989; van Ours, 1989
and 1990; and Gorter, 1991). This is not surprising since
data on vacancies in most countries are rather poor or
absent.
The aim is to study employers’ recruitment behaviour and
vacancy duration by using micro data on ® lled vacancies in
the Dutch labour market. A careful identi® cation of the
determinants of the duration of a vacancy may provide
a better insight into the potential of employers in the labour
market to ® ll di erent kinds of jobs. Jobs with a short
duration of vacancy tend to occur when there is a surplus of
workers suitable to ® ll these jobs, while vacancies which are
hard to ® ll suggest that there is a shortage of workers for
them. One should realize, however, that di erences in va-
cancy duration may also re¯ ect di erences in the duration
of recruitment procedures for di erent jobs. It has been
argued by van Ours and Ridder (1992) that v`acancy dura-
tions in the Dutch labour market are mainly selection
periods and not search periods for applicants’ , because
they found that a`lmost all applicants arrive shortly after
the vacancy has been announced’ . Hence, they concluded
that e`mployer search is mostly non-sequential’ , which
means that e`mployers advertise a vacancy and thereby
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1 The literature focusing on the supply-side of the labour market (see for example, Osberg, 1993 for Canada), which emphasizes the large
number of jobs obtained by personal contacts and direct approaches to the ® rm, suggests that some jobs are ® lled sequentially.
Fig. 1. Unemployment and vacancy rates in the Netherlands,
1980 Ð 88
form a pool of applicants’ . This conclusion is con® rmed
by the follow-up study of van Ours and Ridder (1993) in
which they explicitly distinguish between the application
and the selection period. However, when van Ours and
Ridder (1993) disaggregate by education they ® nd evidence
that low skilled jobs are ® lled sequentially.
In this paper, we shall examine how vacancies are ® lled
when employers use di erent recruitment strategies. For
example, employers may decide to use informal contacts
inside or outside the ® rm before placing an advertisement.
This search strategy might lead to a short duration period
for some vacancies.1 An attempt will be made to shed light
on this issue by studying the determinants of vacancy dura-
tion for each recruitment strategy separately. Moreover, we
shall investigate which factors determine the decision to
activate a recruitment channel.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we
present some information on the Dutch labour market and
a brief overview of recruitment practices in the Netherlands.
Then, in Section III, we shall present the model of em-
ployers’ search which will be used to analyse our duration
data for the Netherlands. After having discussed the ex-
planatory variables of the model in Section IV, we shall
present the estimation results in Section V. Finally, Section
VI contains some concluding remarks.
II . UNEMPLOYMENT, VACANCIES AND
RECRUITMENT IN THE DUTCH
LABOUR MARKET
The Dutch labour market has been characterized by
substantial quantitative and qualitative discrepancies dur-
ing the 1980s. First of all, unemployment has shown a
dramatic growth at the beginning of this period (in absolute
numbers, from 325 000 in 1980 to 820 000 in 1984). Since
the mid 1980s, the situation, re¯ ected by a growth of
employment from - 2% in 1982/83 to 4% in 1985/86
has remarkably improved. In contrast to this upswing in
labour demand, the reduction of unemployment has been
modest in the second part of this decade. This is Ð among
other reasons Ð due to the rise in labour force participation
(the participation rate of women, in particular, increased
signi® cantly: from 35% in 1980 to 45% in 1990). Also,
there appeared to be a signi® cant lack of speci® c job
opportunities for certain socioeconomic groups in the
Dutch labour market.
Another indication of the increase in labour demand is
the growth of job vacancies. Aggregate data on vacancies
can be obtained from the vacancy surveys of the Central
Bureau of Statistics (CBS). In these vacancy surveys some
20 000 ® rms were asked whether they had vacancies at the
date of the survey. The CBS vacancy surveys are conducted
on an annual basis.
Unemployed workers in the Netherlands have to register
at the public employment o ce to be entitled to unem-
ployment bene® ts. Aggregate data on unemployment are
available (monthly) from this registration. When we
combine the macrodata on unemployment and vacancy
data (see Fig. 1), we observe the development of the unem-
ployment and vacancy rates over time. Asmentioned before,
the unemployment rate in the Netherlands has risen sub-
stantially during the 1980s. In 1980 it was about 7%,
in 1984 it was about 18%. Since 1984 unemployment de-
creased somewhat. The vacancy rate decreased from 1.2%
in 1980 to 0.5% in 1983, but increased again in later
years.
An important institutional feature of the functioning of
the Dutch labour market is (as in many Western European
countries) that layo costs are very high due to stringent
regulations that protect workers against u`nreasonable
layo s’. In the Netherlands, the law demands that an em-
ployer must have acceptable reasons to lay o workers (for
more details see Hassink, 1996). It is well-known that high
layo costs lead to a slow downward adjustment of employ-
ment (see, for example, Hamermesh, 1993). Recently, empiri-
cal evidence has been found for the Netherlands that layo
costs are substantially higher than hiring costs (see Hassink,
1996). Hassink also argues, however, that downward adjust-
ment of employment at the ® rm’s level may be faster than
upward adjustment when the ® rm encounters a su cient
number of voluntary quits (these are assumed to be costless
for the ® rm in his analysis). This implies that voluntary quits
may be an important instrument for ® rms that wish to
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Table 1. Recruitment methods in the Netherlands, 1986
First = More than Vacancy
Search channel Relative hiring one channel duration
opened ® rst use (%) (%) used (%) (in weeks)
Advertisements 33 92 28 5.7
Informal contacts 33 56 59 4.1
Labour exchange o ce 13 63 61 4.3
Others 21 71 44 4.2
Source: `How do Firms Recruit?’ (1986), ILBO.
2 Note also that many ® rms in the Netherlands went bankrupt at the beginning of the 1980s, which led to an enormous rise in
unemployment and decrease in employment (as discussed above).
reduce their work force. In addition, Dutch employers have
Ð to a large extent Ð also resorted to encouraging workers to
enter the state of disability and receive high bene® ts (even
when they were not disabled in a strict sense), as an alterna-
tive to laying o workers (as can be seen from the substan-
tially higher proportion of disabled persons in the Nether-
lands in comparison with other European countries; see, e.g.
Aarts et al., 1993).2
Microdata on job vacancies in the Netherlands are avail-
able in the Dutch CBS survey, since here some questions are
asked about the characteristics of the vacancies when ® rms
report them. However, this information is limited in nature
(see, for example, van Ours and Ridder, 1991). Nevertheless,
the CBS survey provides interesting data on the use of the
labour exchange o ce, showing that its use has substan-
tially declined over time (see also van Ours, 1994). The share
of vacancies noti® ed at the labour exchange o ce decreased
from 63% in 1980 to 43% in 1986 (and even 33% in 1987).
Apparently, the recovery of the Dutch economy in the
second part of the 1980s did not coincide with a greater use
of the labour exchange o ce. In this respect, it should be
emphasized that Ð as in many other countries Ð employers
are not obliged to register their vacancies at the Dutch
labour exchange o ce. It is also noteworthy that the Dutch
labour exchange o ce will send applicants to the employer
(when requested) without charge. Nevertheless, we observe
Ð as mentioned above Ð a considerable decline in the (rela-
tive) use of the labour exchange o ce. The main reasons for
the reluctance of employers to make use of the services of
the Dutch labour exchange o ce are twofold, according to
van Ours (1994): e`mployers complain because applicants are
sent too slow and do not ® t the requirements of the employer
in either ability or motivation’ . Interestingly, van Ours (1994)
shows Ð by means of matching analysis Ð that the labour
exchange o ce c`an improve the matching of unemployed
and vacancies by applying intensive mediation methods’ .
An additional reason for the low market share of the labour
exchange o ce is the existence of a negative stigma attached
to applicants originating from a labour exchange o ce
(note that this is also observed in other countries, see, e.g. for
the UK labour market, Adnett, 1987). Barron and Mellow
(1982) have explained this stigma e ect by the fact that the
labour exchange o ce will send applicants who are less
likely to accept a job o er. As a result, ® rms are confronted
with higher screening cost per vacancy when using the labour
exchange o ce. Nonetheless, when it is used the labour
exchange o ce appears to be quite e ective in matching
unemployed workers and vacancies in the Netherlands (see
Lindeboom et al., 1993; Gorter et al., 1993).
A di erent, very rich, data source on vacancies and re-
cruitment practices in the Netherlands stems from a survey
by the ILBO Institute carried out on request of the Dutch
Ministry of Social A airs and Employment (the survey was
called `How do Firms Recruit?’). This survey provides useful
information on the (sequential) activation of various recruit-
ment methods, the length of recruitment duration and also
on the success of di erent recruitment channels (see also
Section IV when we describe this dataset in full detail).
Table 1 summarizes the main features of the recruitment
practices of Dutch ® rms in 1986.
It can be observed that employers usually start searching
for applicants via advertisements (as can be seen from the
`market’ share of 33%) or by using informal contacts (33%).
The labour exchange o ce is much less often activated as
a ® rst channel (13%). Advertisements appear to be extreme-
ly e ective since in almost all cases (92%) the opening of this
channel ® rst leads to the hiring of an applicant via this
channel (i.e., it becomes the hiring channel). When an em-
ployer uses informal contacts ® rst, it turns out to be the
hiring channel in about half of all cases (56%), whereas the
labour exchange o ce has a success rate of 63% (when
opened as a ® rst channel). It is also striking to observe the
di erences across channels regarding the proportion using
more than one channel in the entire recruitment procedure.
In the case of advertisements this ® gure is 28%, whereas it is
59% when informal contacts are ® rst activated. Finally, we
notice that the mean vacancy duration is Ð on average Ð
higher for advertisements (about six weeks) and lower when
informal contacts are ® rst used (approximately four weeks).
The latter observation supports the ® ndings of Roper (1988)
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3 Note that Dutch employers are not forced to search for applicants in this non-sequential way institutionally, but deliberately choose to
do so for e ciency reasons.
4 Employers may decide to screen a reduced number of applicants if the number in the pool is very large. On the other hand, applicants
may also be considered on a case-by-case basis at the moment of arrival (i.e., the size of the pool is equal to one in a sequence).
5 The full recruitment process corresponds to a non-trivial search model with a complicated timing for optimal decisions (such as the
sequence of search channels to activate, the sizes of corresponding pools of applicants and the optimal dates of transition from one channel
to another). This dynamic programming problem is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.
6 This model of employers’ search can be generalized by allowing the employer to choose more than one recruitment channel at the
beginning of the recruitment process. It is also noteworthy that if we make the additional assumption that di erent search channels (or
search channel mix) reach di erent non-overlapping segments of the population, then we have a case similar to the Pandora’s box in
Weitzman (1979).
7 If the cumulative distribution of e c is the type I extreme value (normal), we arrive at the multinominal logit (probit) model withM states
for the probability of choosing a certain search channel (see, for example, Maddala, 1983).
for the UK, which show also that the informal method is the
fastest in vacancy ® lling and newspaper advertisements the
slowest recruitment strategy.
Finally, it should be re-emphasized (see also Section I)
that previous empirical research on employers’ search strat-
egies in the Netherlands has shown evidence that almost all
applicants arrive during the ® rst two weeks after the an-
nouncement of the vacancy (see van Ours and Ridder, 1992).
Apparently, it is bene® cial for the employer ® rst to form
a pool (mainly as a result of placing an advertisement or
notifying the labour exchange o ce) and to select the best
candidate from this pool in the second stage of the recruit-
ment process.3
III . A MODEL OF EMPLOYERS’ SEARCH
In this section, we shall develop an operational model of
employers’ search behaviour which allows for sequential
use of recruitment channels, since our data reveal that
recruitment channels are not opened simultaneously (see
Section IV). Consequently, employers are assumed to start
searching for applicants by activating a recruitment channel
(for example, placing an advertisement). We assume that
the employer will choose the channel with the highest
di erence between expected bene® ts and costs of using
that channel. In the following phase of the recruitment
process, employers delay the screening process and selection
procedures until a pool of applicants is acquired via
that channel. Next, the b`est’ applicant in the pool is selected
on the basis of a set of suitable quali® cations.4 Finally,
the employer decides whether the selected applicant
(from the pool) is acceptable by comparing the expected
productivity of the applicant with the minimum required
productivity level (i.e., the reservation productivity). If this
selected applicant is not acceptable, the employer continues
his recruitment by (i) activating an additional recruitment
channel, (ii) re-activating the o`ld’ channel (for example,
placing a second advertisement) , and/or (iii) waiting for the
arrival of new applicants via the o`ld’ channel.5
This model of employers’ recruitment behaviour will be
formulated by means of separate equations for the choice of
the Þ rst recruitment channel and the corresponding recruit-
ment duration.
As regards the choice of the Þ rst recruitment channel,
our analysis proceeds as follows. Suppose the employer
k`nows’ the di erences in bene® ts (based on the produc-
tivity distribution among potential applicants and the reser-
vation productivity) and costs (formed by direct search
costs, selection and screening costs, and costs of f`oregone’
productivity) between the various channels. Consequently,
the employer is able to evaluate the di erence (U) between
the expected bene® ts (EB) and expected costs (EC) asso-
ciated with the use of a certain search channel c ® rst as
follows:
Uc = EBc - ECc, c (1)
We assume that the employer chooses the ® rst search chan-
nel with the highest positive value U from a set of M
channels.6 Furthermore, the reduced form of the u`tility-
variable’ Uc is simply written as
Uc = Uc(z) + e c (2)
with
z = vector of vacancy characteristics, and
e c = an error term with density function p (e c).
Equation 2 will be estimated by means of a discrete choice
model.7
The second part of our employer’s search model consists
of a search duration equation, which will be formulated
within the framework of the so-called hazard function ap-
proach (see Kiefer, 1988). Let Sca(t) be the arrival rate of
applicants selected via channel c. Prcs is de® ned as the
probability that the applicant selected via channel c is
acceptable, i.e., the expected productivity of the applicant
selected via channel c is higher than the reservation produc-
tivity. Then, the probability that a vacant job is ® lled (via
channel c) during an in® nitesimal short period (t, t + dt)
Ð given that it has been open until t Ð is the product of the
arrival rate of selected applicants and the probability that
an applicant is acceptable:
d c(t) dt = Sca (t) ´Prcs (t) dt (3)
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8 A problem that may occur in this model is that the choice of recruitment channel is also determined by variables not included in the
reduced form model (for example, the unknown wage level). This unknown variable (or error term) may also a ect observed recruitment
duration. In this case, we would end up with a simultaneous equation model in which the error term plays a role in both equations.
However, when this error term is not signi® cantly present in the duration equation, we may estimate the recursive model as speci® ed in
Equations 7 and 8.
9 In Appendix A, the data source is discussed in more detail.
where d c(t) is the intensity at which vacancies are ® lled via
channel c (i.e., the hazard rate). Now, it is assumed that
Sca (t) = Sca (t, z)
Prcs (t) = Prcs [P > Rt)] (4)
Using Equations 3 and 4, we get
d c (t) dt = S ca(t, z) ´Prcs[P > Rt]dt (5)
In our empirical application (see Section V), it appears to be
impossible to identify the di erent components of the prob-
ability that vacancies are ® lled, because our data do not
contain information on the arrival, screening and selection
process. We can only estimate the r`educed form’ of (5) :
d c (t) = d c (t, z) (6)
Although this unrestricted reduced form model makes no
distinction between di erent stages in the recruitment pro-
cess, the underlying structure may be helpful for the inter-
pretation of the estimated e ects. In particular, the e ect of
duration dependence may originate from a time-varying
reservation productivity or changes over time in the arrival
rate of selected applicants per unit of time.
In sum, we arrive at the following recursive model of
employers’ search:8
c = c[z] (7)
d c(t) = d c (t, z) (8)
where c is the recruitment channel with the highest value
Uc (see also Equation 2).
To estimate this model, we have to specify the hazard
function d c and the v`alue variable’ Uc. According to the
proportional hazard model (introduced by Cox, 1972) d c is
speci® ed as:
d c (t |z) = exp (z 9 b c) ´ t c (t) (9)
with t c (t) = a function of elapsed duration t, and b c = a
vector of parameters.
For estimating this kind of model, we have to choose
a functional form for the baseline hazard ( t c(t)).
Next, we specify Uc as
Uc(z) = z 9 ac + e c (10)
and if the cumulative distribution of e c is the type I extreme
value we have
Pr (c |z) =
exp (Uc)
1 +
M
+
c= 1
exp(Uc)
(11)
IV . THE DATA AND EXPLANATORY
VARIABLES
The model developed in Section III will be applied to
data on job vacancies in the Netherlands. Micro data on
vacancies, providing information on search methods and
required skills of the applicant, are scarce in the Nether-
lands. We shall use in our analysis data from a survey of
employers’ recruitment behaviour ( H`ow do Firms Recruit?’)
conducted in April/May 1986. This dataset consists of
a sample of 723 ® lled vacancies.9 In the sample, employers
were questioned about the last vacancy ® lled in the past six
months. In particular, questions were asked about the char-
acteristics of the vacant job and the ® rm (including the
requirements set for the applicant), their recruitment
methods, and the time between the announcement of a va-
cant job and the acceptance of an applicant for that job
(note that this is not necessarily equal to the total duration
of the vacancy: recruitment may start before the job is
actually vacant, and it may take time before an applicant
who has been accepted actually starts working). The time
period between announcement and acceptance (T ) will be
used as a proxy to measure vacancy duration in our model.
As regards the choice of recruitment channels, the dataset
provides information on which channels have been used
during the recruitment process. The following search cat-
egories may in principle be distinguished. First, employers
may search for suitable applicants by using formal channels
(advertising and labour exchange o ce). Second, informal
channels may be used to ® ll a vacancy (recruitment within
the ® rm and the use of informal contacts via friends and
relatives outside the ® rm) and third, other channels (for
example, consulting private employment o ces) may be
used. In addition, we know the sequencing of search chan-
nels (but not Ð in all cases Ð the exact moment of opening)
and also the channel via which the vacancy has been ® lled
(from now on referred to as the hiring channel). In our
model, the choice of the ® rst channel (c) will be used as
a dependent variable. In addition, we shall examine the
duration via the ® rst chosen channel.
The exogenous variables (z) included in the data can be
classi® ed into two groups: variables related to the vacant
job and variables related to the ® rm. The characteristics of
the vacant job can be represented in terms of the applicant’s
required skills (educational level, speci® c educational skills,
and work experience), the presence of age restrictions for the
applicant, and the kind of contract o ered to the applicant
(permanent versus temporary, and full-time versus part-
time). The characteristics of the ® rm are related to the sector
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1 0 The determinants of the timing of opening an additional channel are investigated in Gorter and van Ommeren (1996) by using
multivariate duration techniques.
1 1 Annual vacancy surveys among employers carried out by the Dutch Central Statistical O ce show a constant level of the stock of
vacancies in the relevant year 1986 (see also Fig. 1). Moreover, the decomposition of the stock into vacancy in¯ ow and duration appears to
be almost equal at the beginning and the end of the relevant period (see Van Ours and Ridder, 1991). This information supports the steady
state assumption.
1 2 This is an exogenously strati® ed random sample with strata being identical to ® rms: at most one vacancy per ® rm is sampled.
Furthermore, we note that Ð given the assumption of a steady state Ð there is no length bias present in the data: long spells and short spells
are equally likely in the sample.
1 3 The approach of right-censoring at the moment of activation of a second channel has been adopted since the nature of the recruitment
process itself may change; it becomes a competing risk model and the interaction between competing channels must be taken into account.
1 4 The complete list of estimated parameters (and corresponding standard errors) is available from the authors on request.
1 5 Speci® c experience appears to be signi® cant at the 6% level when choosing between advertisements and informal contacts.
at hand (construction, industrial, services and quaternary
sector, respectively) and the size of the ® rm (small, medium
and large, respectively). Furthermore, the presence of a per-
sonnel department is taken into consideration. Appendix
A contains a summary of the data.
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present the maximum likelihood esti-
mates of the recursive model of the choice of ® rst recruit-
ment channel and the corresponding recruitment duration
(as presented in Section III). Consequently, we consider in
our duration model the speed (i.e., time to ® ll a job) of the
® rst chosen search channel only.1 0
As mentioned in the previous section, we use a sample of
® lled vacancies to estimate the model. We assume here that
the labour market is in a steady state during these six
months, and hence the stock of vacancies is assumed to be
constant in this period (November 1985 Ð April 1986).1 1 In
a steady state, the observed sample of the most recently
® lled vacancies is a random sample of all vacancies which
were ® lled during the past six-month period.1 2 Since in
a steady state in¯ ow and out¯ ow are assumed to be equal
(both in size and composition), one may also consider the
observed sample of ® lled vacancies as a random sample of
jobs ¯ owing into the vacant stock.
Our model of employers’ search involves di erent hazard
functions for each choice of ® rst search channel. Now, let the
length of a vacancy duration spell in our sample be denoted
by T . Then, we have a completed spell of length T for the
hazard model related to channel c, if the ® rst search channel
remains the only channel opened during the recruitment
process (and Ð of course Ð becomes the hiring channel).
Alternatively, we observe a right-censored (or incompleted)
spell of length T rc when the employer activates a second
channel after a period of lengthT rc.
1 3 In this case, the contri-
bution of the duration part (related to channel c) to the
likelihood function becomes equal to S (T rc) = 1 - F (T rc).
However, for some cases in our data the moment at which
the additional channel is activated (T rc) is unknown; we do
not observe the exact T rc when the ® rst channel activated
becomes the hiring channel. So, we only know that this
moment should be at some point in time between 0 and T .
The contribution to the likelihood function of these cases
then becomes the following:
L i = e T
0
Si (t) dt (12)
Finally, we take a piece-wise constant representation for
the baseline hazard t c(t) , so that
t c(t) = t jc, t j ± 1 < t < tj j = 1, ¼ , n (13)
and assume a type I extreme value distribution for the error
term (e c) in the choice model.
First, we discuss the outcomes of the multinominal logit
model for the c`hoice of ® rst channel’ . The main ® ndings of
this model are summarized in Table 2 (in Appendix B we
show the multinominal logit estimates relative to the cat-
egory o`thers’ ; from these coe cients one can also obtain
the results for choosing between other pairs of search chan-
nels presented in Table 2; for example, the choice between
advertisements and informal contacts).1 4 We observe that
employers prefer to start searching by placing an advertise-
ment instead of using informal contacts if (i) speci® c work
experience is required;1 5 (ii) the applicant should belong to
a certain age group; (iii) an administrative job has to be
® lled; (iv) it concerns a permanent or full-time job; and
(v) the ® rm is of medium size. Using advertisements is
expected to be more costly than informal methods due to
higher direct recruitment costs of placing an advertisement
in a newspaper, higher costs of f`oregone’ productivity
(because it probably takes more time to ® ll a vacancy)
and higher screening costs (because the ® rm has less reliable
information about the applicants). Despite these costs, em-
ployers decide to use advertisements in the case of (perma-
nent, full-time) jobs requiring speci® c work experience and
a speci® c age, since they expect that the b`est’ candidate
Ð selected via a pool of applicants Ð will have such a level
of productivity that this more than o sets the expected
costs of recruitment. The same argument may apply to
administrative jobs and vacancies originating in ® rms of
medium size.
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Table 2. Overview of signiÞ cant e¤ ects (at 5%) on the choice of Þ rst recruitment channel
Choice of
recruitment channel Signi® cant determinants
Advertisements * Administrative job relative to o`thers’
versus * Medium sized ® rm relative to small ® rm
informal contacts * No personnel department
* Age requirements
* Permanent job
* Full-time job
Advertisements * Medium/large sized ® rm relative to small ® rm
versus * Quaternary sector relative to industrial sector
Labour exchange o ce * Speci® c experience required relative to no experience required
* Permanent job
Advertisements * Administrative/sales job relative to others
versus * Quaternary sector relative to industrial sector
o`thers’ * No personnel department
* Speci® c/non-speci® c experience required relative to no experience required
* Age requirements
Informal contacts * Large sized ® rm relative to small ® rm
versus * Service sector relative to industrial sector
Labour exchange o ce
Informal contacts * Speci® c experience required relative to
versus no experience required
o`thers’ * Quaternary sector relative to industrial sector
* Part-time job
Labour exchange o ce * None
versus
o`thers’
1 6 Note that in Table 3 the e ects of the variables on the hazard rate are presented; the e ects on recruitment duration have the opposite
sign.
Advertisements are also preferred by employers to
o`thers’ in the case of administrative/sales jobs, vacancies in
the quaternary sector and requirements associated with age
and work experience.
Another ® nding is that the labour exchange o ce is
chosen instead of advertisements when (i) no experience is
required; (ii) the position is temporary; and (iii) the vacant
job occurs in a small ® rm or the industrial sector. In the
latter case, employers also prefer the labour exchange o ce
to the use of informal contacts. Hence, it seems that the
labour exchange o ce is primarily activated as the ® rst
search channel when jobs in the s`econdary segment of the
market’ have to be ® lled.
The minimum level of education required appears to play
no signi® cant role in the decision to activate the ® rst recruit-
ment channel. A perhaps unexpected result is found for the
presence of a personnel department. It is found that ® rms
having a personnel department make signi® cantly more use
of informal search methods than advertisements. This e ect
might stem from a higher ability to recruit for applicants
inside the ® rm.
Next, we turn to the estimation results of the hazard
models for ® lling a vacancy via the ® rst chosen search
channel (see Table 3).1 6 Clearly, the e ects of the exogenous
variables vary considerably over the recruitment channels.
More speci® cally, we can draw the following conclusions.
First of all, it takes signi® cantly more time to ® ll jobs
requiring high educational levels via advertisements than
® lling jobs requiring a low educational level. This implies
that either there exists a shortage of workers with speci® c
educational quali® cations or relatively long selection and
screening procedures are carried out when hiring a highly
educated person. Requiring higher skill levels (namely, edu-
cational level and speci® c educational demands) leads to
signi® cantly longer durations when using informal contacts.
This positive e ect on the duration of ® lling a job suggests
that it is more di cult to ® nd a highly skilled employee,
because Ð in the case of using informal contacts Ð screening
procedures are expected to be relatively short. Large ® rms
tend to use more time than small ® rms when a job is ® lled
via an informal contact. Small ® rms probably have more
¯ exible procedures than large ® rms during the hiring pro-
cess. Moreover, vacant jobs classi® ed into the `medical,
educational and social’ occupational group are remarkably
rapidly ® lled when using advertisements or informal con-
tacts, while jobs in the quaternary sector are very di cult to
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Table 3. Estimation results of hazard functions for Þ lling a job vacancy via the Þ rst recruitment channel
Choice of ® rst recruitment channel
Advertisements Informal Labour o ce Others
Variables
Required education
low vocational - 0.99 (0.48)* - 0.43 (0.37) 0.14 (0.76) 0.17 (0.45)
secondary - 1.17 (0.52)* - 0.87 (0.46)* 0.46 (0.91) 0.30 (0.67)
extended vocational - 1.91 (0.53)* - 0.54 (0.46) - 0.19 (1.29) - 0.13 (0.75)
high - 2.39 (0.54)* - 1.10 (0.54)* - 0.51 (1.28) - 0.03 (1.11)
Occupational group
administrative 0.56 (0.37) 0.54 (0.49) - 1.28 (0.79) - 0.76 (0.56)
sales - 0.27 (0.40) - 0.08 (0.51) - 1.40 (1.28) - 0.59 (0.63)
technical 0.14 (0.38) 0.42 (0.42) - 0.67 (0.91) - 0.72 (0.47)
medical/educ./soc. 0.92 (0.43)* 1.80 (0.71)* 1.00 (1.27) 0.30 (0.63)
production 0.46 (0.41) 0.35 (0.45) - 1.11 (0.92) 0.49 (0.43)
Size of the ® rm
medium 0.35 (0.21) 0.17 (0.27) - 0.30 (0.47) - 0.40 (0.35)
large 0.02 (0.24) - 0.77 (0.34)* - 0.89 (0.75) - 0.52 (0.43)
Sector
construction 0.03 (0.21) 0.45 (0.35) - 0.25 (0.63) 0.01 (0.62)
services 0.18 (0.24) 0.19 (0.35) 0.11 (0.64) - 0.09 (0.36)
quaternary - 0.17 (0.28) - 0.73 (0.45) - 1.90 (0.88)* - 0.24 (0.60)
Personnel department - 0.23 (0.20) - 0.06 (0.27) - 0.66 (0.57) 0.24 (0.29)
Experience required
non-speci® c 0.28 (0.32) - 0.45 (0.39) - 0.26 (0.62) - 0.19 (0.34)
speci® c - 0.09 (0.25) - 0.29 (0.28) - 0.19 (0.52) - 0.43 (0.29)
Age requirements 0.19 (0.20) - 0.34 (0.26) - 0.07 (0.50) - 0.44 (0.27)
Permanent job - 0.39 (0.33) - 0.45 (0.30) - 1.33 (0.52)* - 0.00 (0.44)
Full time job - 0.27 (0.25) 0.19 (0.33) - 0.63 (0.70) 0.11 (0.58)
Speci® c educ. req. 0.17 (0.20) - 0.78 (0.31)* - 0.61 (0.64) 0.60 (0.41)
New job created 0.24 (0.20) 0.07 (0.24) 0.31 (0.46) 0.21 (0.27)
Number of observations 237 238 92 156
Mean log-likelihood - 1.61 - 0.92 - 0.68 - 1.21
Notes: Reference groups of the exogenous variables are given as follows: required education (primary),
occupational group (others), size of the ® rm (small), sector of the ® rm (industrial), personnel department (no
personnel department), required experience (no experience), age restrictions (no restrictions), permanent job
(temporary), full time job (part time), new job created (replacement).
Standard errors in parentheses. * Signi® cant at the 5% level.
® ll via the labour exchange o ce. Finally, temporary jobs
are more quickly ® lled than permanent jobs via the labour
exchange o ce. Thus, apparently it is very di cult for the
labour exchange o ce to match their registered (mainly
unemployed) job seekers with permanent jobs. It is plausible
that the permanent nature of the job is a signal of the
importance of the job for the ® rm. Moreover, it is more
di cult for ® rms to adjust possible mistakes made in actual
recruitment for permanent jobs. In the light of these two
observations, several explanations may be given for the
di culty in ® lling permanent jobs via the labour exchange
o ce. For example, it takes the labour exchange o ce
a great deal of time (e.g. due to pre-screening activities on
motivation, ability, work-experience, etc.) to send applicants
to the ® rm with a vacant permanent position. Another
reason could be that employers apply lengthy screening
procedures for applicants sent by the labour exchange o ce
to ® ll a permanent position (probably due to the negative
stigma attached to applicants showing up via the labour
exchange o ce).
Now we present the patterns of the hazard rates over time
(based on estimates of the piece-wise constant function
t with weekly steps for the ® rst two months) for the recruit-
ment channels advertisement and informal contacts (see
Figs 2 and 3). As can be seen from the graphs, we ® nd
remarkably di erent patterns for the hazard rate over time.
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Fig. 2. Hazard rate over time for using advertisements,
h Advertisements
Fig. 3. Hazard rate over time for using informal contacts
+ informal contacts
1 7 After about two months (t greater or equal to eight weeks), we have taken the hazard rate to be constant over time.
1 8 Detailed results are available from the authors on request.
If employers decide to use advertisements ® rst, we see that
the hazard rate is positive duration dependent with a peak
of exit at six weeks.1 7 This suggests that employers search
non-sequentially, that is, they acquire a pool of applicants
and select the next candidates from this pool after having
screened the ® rst to arrive. Hence, this result is a further
con® rmation of the conclusion drawn by van Ours and
Ridder (1992) that when employers advertise they form
a pool of applicants.
Our results, however, reveal also that if employers start
searching by using informal contacts, the hazard rate
appears to be negative duration dependent. This means that
either the recruitment channel works quickly (as is shown
by the relatively high level of the hazard rate during the ® rst
four weeks) or it does not work at all. In the latter case,
employers decide to switch to other channels (for example,
placing an advertisement) and hence, the vacancy will not be
® lled via the ® rst chosen recruitment channel.
As regards the pattern for the labour exchange o ce and
o`thers’, we ® nd neither positive nor negative duration de-
pendence of the hazard rate.
We conclude our analysis by testing whether there is
unobserved heterogeneity present in the duration model for
each recruitment channel c. For this purpose, the duration
models are re-estimated with a two-points heterogeneity
component v = (v1 , v2 ) included in the constant term of the
hazard rate (while Pr(v1 ) = a and hence, Pr(v2 ) = 1 - a ).
The parameters of the duration model ( b , t , a , v1 , v2 ) are
estimated by maximum likelihood methods for each choice
of the ® rst search channel c. The results show that Ð for each
submodel related to search channel c Ð the added heterogen-
eity components (v1 , v2 ) converge to the same value, while
the probability parameter a becomes 1/2. The parameters of
the exogenous variables (z) and the time-varying dummies
(t c(t)) remained the same as before.
1 8 Apparently, the statist-
ical variation of the hazard over time (as shown in Figs 2
and 3 for advertisements and informal contacts respectively)
was already captured by the time-varying dummies. We
conclude that neglected heterogeneity does not in¯ uence the
outcomes of the reduced form duration models correspond-
ing to each recruitment strategy and hence, it seems to be
justi® ed to estimate the duration and c`hoice of ® rst channel’
models separately.
VI . CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we used micro data on vacancy duration and
search channels to analyse the recruitment strategy of em-
ployers. To this end, a model for the choice of recruitment
strategy and the hazard of ® lling a vacancy via the chosen
search strategy is developed. In the absence of unobserved
heterogeneity in the r`educed form’ duration models for
each search channel, this model can be estimated separately.
The e ects on the choice of the ® rst recruitment channel are
interpreted within the context of an employer’s search
model in which the employer chooses ® rst the channel with
the highest value for expected bene® ts minus expected costs.
The underlying structure of the hazard rate of ® lling a va-
cancy via a speci® c recruitment channel is formulated
in terms of the well known product of arrival rate (of
selected applicants) and probability that an applicant is
acceptable.
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The model is estimated for the Dutch labour market by
taking the ® rst chosen recruitment channel and correspond-
ing recruitment duration as dependent variables. The results
of the choice model show that advertisements are chosen as
the ® rst channel when work experience is required. It also
appears that the labour exchange o ce is activated by
employers as the ® rst search channel in the case of vacancies
originating in the s`econdary segment’ of the labour market.
Estimates for the hazard models suggest that if an advertise-
ment is used, employers search in a non-sequential way.
Moreover, advertising takes more time in the case of va-
cancies requiring high educational levels. This result is
nicely in line with previous studies for the Dutch labour
market (see van Ours and Ridder, 1992). A di erent picture
emerges, however, when employers decide to start searching
via informal contacts. The time-varying pattern of the haz-
ard associated with this search method shows either rapid
success (i.e., hiring an applicant via this channel) or hardly
any success at all. Hence, screening and selection periods
cannot take much time when informal contacts are ® rst
activated.
In summary, focusing on the choice of search methods
and vacancy duration provided useful information about
employers’ recruitment procedures. Future structural analy-
sis of the full recruitment strategy (sequencing and timing of
search channels, length of screening and selection processes,
direct recruitment costs of using a particular channel, and
optimal size of the pool of applicants) may lead to an even
more comprehensive analysis of the manner in which va-
cancies are ® lled.
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APPENDIX A
The data source
The data used in our analysis of vacancy duration stem from
the survey `How do Firms Recruit?’. This survey of em-
ployers’ recruitment behaviour was undertaken for the ® rst
time in December 1984 and has been subsequently repeated
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every year. In April/May 1986 a sample of 3198 ® rms was
drawn. Non-response and other reasons (such as ® rm clos-
ures) reduced the sample to 2702 ® rms. The remaining
sample was strati® ed according to (construction, industrial,
service, and quaternary) sector and ® rm size (small, medium,
large). From the sample in this survey, ® rms were selected
Sample means of the variables
Choice of ® rst recruitment channel
Advertisements Informal Lab. o ce Others Entire sample
% % % % %
Variables
Required education
primary 6 11 10 12 10
low vocational 19 32 41 40 30
secondary 22 18 23 19 20
extended vocational 32 23 15 20 24
high 21 16 11 9 16
Occupational group
administrative 31 20 32 20 25
sales 15 11 7 9 11
technical 20 27 23 20 23
medical/educational/social 12 6 7 7 8
production 13 25 23 33 22
others 9 11 8 11 11
Size of the ® rm
small 22 29 40 28 28
medium 47 32 39 39 39
large 31 39 21 33 33
Sector
industrial 20 20 26 30 24
construction 14 26 28 23 21
services 27 29 23 31 28
quaternary 39 25 23 16 27
Personnel department 44 50 35 47 45
Experience required
no work experience 18 16 38 42 28
non-speci® c 12 12 17 17 14
speci® c 70 62 45 41 58
Age requirements 55 45 54 49 50
Permanent job 90 80 79 85 84
Full time job 84 80 84 88 84
Speci® c educational requirements 56 42 34 40 45
New job created 30 35 35 37 34
Number of channels used
one (® rst is hiring) 72 41 39 56 54
more than one
(® rst is hiring) 20 15 24 25 20
additional is hiring 8 44 37 19 26
Mean vacancy duration 5.7 4.1 4.3 4.2 4.7
(in weeks)
Number of observations 237 238 92 156 723
on the basis of two criteria: ® rst, that they should have had
at least one vacancy which has been ® lled during the past six
months; second, that the search for applicants used external
channels only, or a combination of both internal and ex-
ternal channels. In this way a subsample of 723 ® rms Ð used
in this paper Ð was selected.
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APPENDIX B
Multinominal logit estimates of c`hoice of ® rst recruitment channel’ model; reference category is o`thers’
Choice of ® rst recruitment channel, relative to o`thers’
Advertisement Informal Labour o ce
Variables
Constant - 2.07 (0.75)* 0.43 (0.66) - 0.02 (0.82)
Required education
low vocational - 0.60 (0.43) - 0.33 (0.38) 0.08 (0.48)
secondary - 0.14 (0.51) - 0.13 (0.48) - 0.24 (0.61)
extended vocational 0.25 (0.54) 0.36 (0.50) - 0.05 (0.66)
high 0.60 (0.58) 0.77 (0.56) 0.36 (0.73)
Occupational group
administrative 0.89 (0.46) * - 0.13 (0.44) 0.94 (0.56)
sales 1.03 (0.51) * 0.48 (0.50) - 0.08 (0.68)
technical 0.87 (0.47) 0.73 (0.44) 0.10 (0.58)
medical/educational/social - 0.12 (0.58) - 1.10 (0.60) - 0.23 (0.76)
production 0.16 (0.48) 0.35 (0.43) - 0.49 (0.56)
Size of the ® rm
medium 0.49 (0.30) - 0.32 (0.28) - 0.31 (0.33)
large 0.24 (0.35) 0.14 (0.33) - 0.73 (0.42)
Sector
construction - 0.38 (0.36) 0.26 (0.33) 0.10 (0.40)
services - 0.05 (0.32) 0.26 (0.31) - 0.55 (0.40)
quaternary 1.38 (0.41)* 0.88 (0.41)* 0.24 (0.49)
Personnel department - 0.58 (0.27)* - 0.03 (0.26) - 0.38 (0.33)
Experience required
non-speci® c 0.88 (0.36)* 0.29 (0.35) 0.20 (0.41)
speci® c 1.47 (0.27)* 0.99 (0.26)* 0.41 (0.32)
Age restrictions 0.74 (0.24)* 0.10 (0.23) 0.54 (0.29)
Permanent job 0.51 (0.35) - 0.36 (0.30) - 0.35 (0.36)
Full time job 0.04 (0.37) - 0.74 (0.36) - 0.05 (0.44)
Speci® c educational requirements - 0.30 (0.30) - 0.53 (0.30) - 0.55 (0.37)
New job created 0.02 (0.25) - 0.08 (0.24) - 0.07 (0.30)
Number of observations 723
- 2 log likelihood for full model 1722.6
- 2 log likelihood for restricted model 1915.4
% correctly predicted 46.1
Maddala’s pseudo R2 0.23
Notes: Reference groups of the exogenous variables are given in brackets: required education (primary),
occupational group (others), size of the ® rm (small), sector of the ® rm (industrial), personnel department (no
personnel department), required experience (no experience), age restrictions (no restrictions), permanent job
(temporary), full time job (part time), new job created (replacement).
Standard errors in parentheses. * Signi® cant at 5%.
.
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